Garri B. Hendell: Failure Mechanisms in Democratic Regimes – an Army’s Role
Lt. Col. Hendell completed three overseas deployments to the Middle East and four overseas training missions to Europe. He is a member of the Society for the Rule of Law and is currently assigned as the Red Team Chief on the 28th Infantry Division staff. This article originally appeared on The Angry Staff Officer blog.
The United States was born of a desire to leave behind monarchial government and instead live under a republic. Although the structure of the United States was explicitly crafted to have both democratic and anti-democratic elements, the perils of democracy have been part of the American discussion from the beginning (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens”). The allure of democracy is simple: by allowing people to collectively express their collective will, a representative government should be entitled to rely on their support in carrying out its political agenda. This social contract between the governed and those who govern should, in most cases, be a recipe for broad acceptance of the program of government.
Nevertheless, in the 20th Century, as the memory of monarchies faded and the threats of fascism and communism blossomed, Americans have gradually come to believe that democracy embodied the American project. Despite America’s traditional suspicion of pure democracy (and James Madison’s plea for a government run by enlightened delegates), “democracy” came to stand for all that is good and holy in a world threatened by godless collectivism and/or authoritarianism. Beginning with President Wilson’s exhortation to “make the world safe for democracy” our Founders’ strong philosophical misgivings about mob rule appear to have been discarded as part of America’s search for common ground with allies against authoritarian alternatives. Unlike the Founders, 20th Century Americans weren’t trying to rise above the shortcomings of western European governments in such as those in France or Britain, but rather trying to find common cause with them.
Indeed, in the present moment we now call anything we favor “democratic” and anything we oppose “un-democratic.” We do this even when the problem we are concerned with is itself an inherently democratic one, only reluctantly acknowledging the very significant role played by the pervasive (and anti-democratic) “checks and balances” built into our own federal constitution. The fault lines inherent in democracies—so well known to the Founders—can be showcased by (mostly) contemporary examples. All have lessons for armies—as the premier land force at the disposal of national governments. As military professionals, it is incumbent on soldiers to consider at least a few of the pitfalls which may beset a democracy and ponder the involvement of armies therein.
1. The problem of having the “last” election – electing anti-democratic government.
The 2006 election of Hamas to govern the Gaza strip is instructive. Despite President Biden’s 2023 pronouncement that “Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people” in 2006 Hamas was elected to govern Gaza, at least by a plurality of votes (44%). Having won the largest block of legislative seats, it was to govern in coalition with other political parties. Hamas instead went to war with its coalition partner (Fatah, who remains in control of the West Bank) and took control of Gaza by a program of internal repression and political assassination. No elections have been held since.
There were insufficient state institutions (or committed outside forces) to ensure that the rules—rules which would have ensured Hamas’ legitimacy as the primary political force in Gaza, at least for that election cycle—were respected. An election was insufficient to seal any sort of social contract where the other institutions of the Palestinian proto-state (the rule of law, independent courts, political parties committed to democratic principles) were too weak to ensure the agreed-upon rules were followed. Even if capable and available military forces had been available to enforce the rules, the governing structures were too weak to support their employment.
2. Mob rule and orgies of violence.
Americans watched the French Revolution’s reign of terror in horror in late 1700s France. The storming of the Bastille and the violent daily uprisings in Paris foreshadowed what was to come. Soldiers from the King’s army took the side of the crowds. A citizen’s militia exploited the lack of political support for the King’s troops. Mob action eventually devoured both the crowd’s own leadership and France’s nascent democracy, leading to a coup by a young army general. Napoleon Bonaparte became Europe’s first modern dictator, raising a fearsome military machine based on mass conscription. The result was 23 years of war in Europe (eventually dragging the U.S. into war Britain).
Where support for the institutions of the state (Louis XVI) was crumbling, effective military support was not possible. The social contract between the people and their government had broken down to the point where the employment of state military force shared the same degree of illegitimacy as the government itself. Parallel, opposing forces spontaneously generated to oppose the forces of the state.
3. Dependence on extremist support for political survival.
Although the creeping re-assertion of heretofore unpalatable political parties has been a recurring feature of modern European politics, a recent example in Lithuania may be a useful single event to consider. A politician with a history of anti-Semitic beliefs created a new party to run in national parliamentary elections and won sufficient support to be a necessary political partner for one of the two main political parties to form a government. Of course, in multi-party parliamentary systems, coalition governments made up of several small political parties are the norm. However, the taboo against including extremist parties in such coalitions is dissolving.
With some exceptions, we have not seen the wholesale use of military force in respect to the “normal” operation of democratic political systems in post-WWII Europe. Given massive U.S. support for the Baltic states, however, it will be instructive to see how these trends implicate U.S. Army involvement in European defense initiatives and assistance. In Lithuania, we have seen recent use of military forces to reinforce border security (not always with happy results). As the political balance of their government changes, one might consider what proportion of the limited Lithuanian Land Forces (a division-sized element) may be re-allocated to internal security missions and away from US-led NATO priorities.
4. Pretextual assertion of emergency powers to extinguish civil liberties.
The best-known modern example is the Reichstag fire of 1933. The governing German national socialist party—a participant in democratic processes while being an enemy to the democratic system—used an act by an unknown arsonist to convince the president that emergency powers were required to forestall an uprising by communists. The civil and political rights thereby abolished were never restored and led to the dictatorship with which our grandparents were all familiar, igniting not only civil repression and a takeover of the apparatus of the state but also a militarily expansive Germany and the second World War.
This is simultaneously one of the most difficult and most straightforward examples of a democratic faultline, as it does not reflect a lack of (or disintegration of) state power leading to an ineffective use of military force, nor does it represent an incremental participation in government by elements previously considered outside the four corners of acceptable political discourse, but a wholesale co-opting of the state and its military forces, towards popular but unlawful and immoral ends. Although there was opposition to the regime from inside the German armed forces (and the level of enthusiasm within the military for anti-constitutional action matters), the overall popularity of the regime’s approach forced the matter to be settled by a contest with outside powers, at tremendous cost (German military casualties of 5.5 million were only surpassed by the Soviet Union’s).
5. Repression of minority groups.
Inherent in majority rule is that the majority makes the rules. Mechanisms to moderate this inherent feature of democracies have included Britain’s patchwork of fundamental laws and strong political norms (its “unwritten constitution”), written constitutions that occupy the apex of a national hierarchy of norms, as well as international agreements and customs (which, in the aftermath of the unipolar world and Pax Americana, are largely inspired by, and are consistent with, America’s own values).
That said, majority rule can involve the use of state power to oppress minority groups. America has easily recalled examples. More contemporary examples also often involve conflict between ethnic groups. Perhaps the most striking is the Rwandan genocide of 1994, where state power became concentrated in a historically-subordinated majority group, leading to a violent backlash against the previously-dominant minority. Five million deaths ensued. Here, the military forces of the Rwandan state were complicit in the violence, which was only ended when a militia aligned with the previously-dominant minority group returned to power, backed by the army of a neighboring state.
6. Redefining conduct to skirt mandatory prohibitions.
Here we can consider a modern, American example: post-9/11 detainee abuse. This was accomplished as the result of efforts by the executive branch to disingenuously re-define fundamental norms to allow mistreatment of detainees in US custody.
The military’s role, such as at the military prison in Abu Ghraib, was subsequently well documented. The military was involved because it was indispensable to executing the government’s plan. For large projects of national importance, even those strictly outside the military sphere, often there is no other arm of the government that possesses the necessary manpower, facilities, and equipment.
In this instance, the political leadership’s call to unlawful and illegitimate action was largely and steadfastly resisted by the military leadership (particularly the military legal community) based on the baked-in values inherent in Army doctrine. Ultimately, that resistance (as well as the statutory prohibition and related obligations in international law) were overcome by the determination of the political leadership of the day and the primacy of civilian control of the military.
What else?
Of course this is not a comprehensive list. Democracies can fail in numerous ways, although not all impact armies disproportionately. For example, while crony capitalism and the associated destruction of independent bureaucracies certainly can bring a democracy to its knees, armies are impacted by corruption of state institutions similarly to other government departments.
What is the lesson here?
The U.S. military has an extreme reluctance to involve itself in political questions. The intrigue and coups d’etat that have plagued other nations as a result of their military’s involvement in politics are foreign to our experience. The Army has been, however, occasionally compelled to appear as an actor on the American political scene and, of course, has been employed inside the continental United States.
That said, as a result of Army’s non-negotiable contract with the American people to “support and defend the Constitution, subordinate to civilian authority, and obey the laws of the Nation and the orders of those appointed over us [and] reject and report illegal or immoral orders or actions” America’s Army is always at risk of being drawn into the pitfalls to which the nation herself is subject. The Army is not only a national institution, but a moral construct based on shared, American values. As trustworthy, professional, competent, and committed experts in the service of our great national project, soldiers must constantly evaluate the role the Army is tasked to play in the American republic to ensure that the pitfalls inherent in democratic systems are avoided.
This is not only an institutional imperative, but an individual one, as Fourth Army commanding general (and Medal of Honor recipient) Johnathan Wainright admonished soldiers demobilizing from the second World War:
You have seen, in the lands where you worked and fought and where many of your comrades died, what happens when the people of a nation lose interest in their government. You have seen what happens when they follow false leaders. You have seen what happens when a nation accepts hate and intolerance.
We are all determined that what happened in Europe and in Asia must not happen to our country…If you see intolerance and hate, speak out against them. Make your individual voices heard, not for selfish things, but for honor and decency among men, for the rights of all people.
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